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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
This survey of California, a regular feature of 
the Women's Law Forum, summarizes recent 
California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
decisions of special importance to women. A 
brief analysis of the issues pertinent to women 
raised in each case is provided. 
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I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. SEX OFFENSES 
1. Perpetrator may be convicted of multiple, identical, 
consecutive sexual offenses if, according to the statu-
tory definition of the applicable crime, the previous of-
fense has ended before the next offense is begun. 
In People v. Harrison, 196 Cal. App. 3d 828, 242 Cal. Rptr. 
223 (1987), the California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate 
District, upheld the conviction of a perpetrator of multiple, 
identical sexual offenses, committed consecutively. The court 
used the statutory definition of the applicable crime to deter-
mine whether the previous offense had ended before the next 
offense had begun. 
Defendant Harrison entered the apartment of V.N., the vic-
tim, early one morning in June of 1985. After hitting her in the 
face as she lay in her bed, Harrison reached into V.N.'s under-
wear and put his finger in her vagina. V.N. found herself half-
standing next to the bed and continued to struggle until Harri-
son's finger came out. Harrison pushed V.N. onto the bed, put 
his hand over her mouth to muffle her screams, and put his fin-
ger in her vagina a second time. V.N. pried his hand off her 
mouth and Harrison hit her again in the face. V.N. freed herself 
and attempted to get to the door. As she began to run, Harrison 
grabbed her hair, began to punch her, and inserted his finger 
into her vagina. V.N. continued to struggle and told Harrison 
that she would "do it" if he stopped. V.N. entered the bathroom, 
locked the door, opened up the window and began to scream 
"rape". 
The first penetration lasted approximately four seconds, the 
second and third penetrations approximately five seconds each. 
The attack lasted seven to ten minutes. Harrison was convicted 
by a jury of three counts of forcible genital penetration with a 
foreign objectl and sentenced to eight years for one count, and 
two years for each of the others. 
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (Deering's 1985 & Supp. 1988) punishes the forcible pene-
tration of the vagina or anus of another with a foreign object. 
3
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Harrison appealed the judgment, contending that the evi-
dence supported only one count of forcible penetration, and that 
a conyiction of three counts of forcible penetration violated Cali-
fornia Penal Code Section 654.2 
In concluding that Harrison's attack was indeed comprised 
of three separable offenses, the appellate court discussed three 
recent cases in which a similar issue had been raised. 
In People v. Perez,3 a trial court had held that section 654 
precluded conviction for acts of sodomy, rape, and oral copula-
tion against a single victim within a forty-five minute time span, 
as all three offenses were committed with the common intent 
and objective of sexual gratification. The Supreme Court re-
versed. It stated that although there was a general common in-
tent, precluding punishment for separate offenses would "violate 
the statute's purpose to insure that a defendant's punishment 
will be commensurate with his culpability."4 The court held as 
long as none of the offenses were committed as a means of com-
mitting any other, section 654 did not preclude punishment for 
each separate offense. 
The Harrison court then discussed People v. Marks." In 
this case an appellate court upheld defendant's conviction on 
two counts of sodomy. Defendant had moved the victim, reposi-
tioned her, and covered her head between the two acts. The 
court stated that "[d]efendant, who caused his victim to undergo 
two separate humiliating and painful violations of her body, was 
more culpable in committing the two acts of sodomy than if he 
had committed only one."s 
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (Deering's 1983) provides that "[a]n act or omission which 
is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be pun-
ished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than 
one . ... " 
3. People v. Harrison, 196 Cal. App. 3d 828, 832, 242 Cal. Rptr. 223, 225 (1987), 
citing People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d. 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1979). 
4. Id. at 832, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 225, citing Perez, 23 Cal. 3d at 552, 591 P.2d at 68, 
153 Cal. Rptr. at 44. 
5. Id. at 833, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 226, citing People v. Marks, 184 Cal. App. 3d 458, 229 
Cal. Rptr. 107 (1986). 
6. Id. at 833, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 226, citing Marks, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 467, 229 Cal. 
Rptr. at 112. 
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The court also relied on People u. Hammon,7 where an ap-
pellate court delineated the criteria for identifying when multi-
ple sexual offenses can be found. That court held that a series of 
varied sexual acts, a rape followed by sodomy constituted sepa-
rate offenses. However, if the series of sexual acts were identical, 
the perpetrator must have had a reasonable opportunity for re-
flection between the acts, if multiple offenses were to be found.s 
The Harrison court rejected the Hammon test for two rea-
sons. First, the court viewed the addition of a requirement that 
the perpetrator must have had a reasonable opportunity to re-
flect as "judicial legislation". When drafting the applicable crim-
inal statute, the legislature failed to include any requirement of 
reflection. Therefore, reliance on any such judicially-created re-
quirement to determine when a sexual offense is initiated would 
be in defiance of legislative intent. 
Second, the court found the Hammon court's distinction be-
tween consecutive, varied sexual offenses and consecutive, iden-
tical offenses illogical. The court stated that the application of 
the Hammon test would mean that a perpetrator who raped and 
then sodomized his victim could be convicted of both acts, while 
a perpetrator who raped, and then raped his victim again would 
be required to have had a "reasonable opportunity for reflec-
tion" between acts. This distinction would have the effect of re-
warding the "unimaginative" sexual offender by making it more 
difficult to convict him for both offenses. 
In the instant case, the court held that in order to deter-
mine whether one offense has ended and another has begun, 
"[t]he touchstone must be the legislature's definition of the of-
fense."9 The statute under which Daryl Harrison was convicted, 
Section 289(a) of the Penal Code, the statute under which Daryl 
Harrison was convicted, punishes "[the] penetration, however 
slight, of the genital or anal openings of another person ... ".10 
The court then reasoned that the offense ended when the for-
7. ld. 834, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 226, citing People v. Hammon, 191 Cal. App. 3d. 1084, 
236 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1987). 
8. ld. at 834, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 227, citing Hammon, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1099, 236 
Cal. Rptr. at 822. 
9. ld. at 836, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 228. 
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(a) (Deering's 1985 & Supp. 1988). 
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eign object, Harrison's finger, was withdrawn. V.N. forced Harri-
son to withdraw twice, each time terminating the offense. There-
fore, it was within the trial court's discretion, therefore, to 
sentence Harrison for three counts of vaginal penetration. 
The majority correctly recognized that "[t]he factual variety 
of human misconduct precludes our articulating any particular 
criteria."ll By dictating that all the circumstances will be ex-
amined, and that the statutory definition will be used to deter-
mine whether an attack has ended, the court set forth a test 
which is workable, and which unlike the Hammon test, adheres 
to legislative intent. 
Amy C. Hirschkron* 
2. Accused child molesters are entitled to discovery of the 
victim's psychiatric history. 
People v. Caplan, 193 Cal. App. 3d 543, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478 
(4th Dist. 1987). In People v. Caplan, the California Court of 
Appeal ruled that the trial court erred when it refused to allow 
(as privileged) discovery of and introduction into evidence of the 
victim's psychiatric history; thereby depriving the defendant of 
his constitutional rights of due process, confrontation and cross-
examination. This case involved criminal sexual abuse against a 
then four year old girl. 
However, the court also ruled that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the defendant's conviction for committing two 
counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a minor; or alternatively, 
having a minor child orally copulate him on two separate 
occasions. l 
The expert testimony that was erroneously excluded con-
11. Harrison. 196 Cal. App. 3d at 837. 242 Cal. Rptr. at 229. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law. Class of 1989. 
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288A (A) (West Supp. 1988) or alternatively CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 288A (c) (West Supp. 1988). 
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cerned physical evidence of sexual abuse and did not apply to 
the oral copulation counts. In addition, there was corroborating 
testimony to support the child's unwavering accounts of the oral 
copulation incidences. 
The victim (Cindy) was almost four years old when she 
went to live in the home of her foster parents, Daniel and Deb-
bie Caplan.2 A little over a year later Mrs. Caplan became suspi-
cious that Cindy was being molested by Caplan8 and mentioned 
her fears to her nurse practitioner, who filed a report of sus-
pected child abuse. 
Cindy was taken for a physical examination at the Chil-
dren's Hospital where a doctor assessed the child's physical 
symptoms: vaginal and anal redness, swelling and tenderness. 
The doctor attributed the symptoms to poor hygiene techniques 
and a possible case of pinworms. Still, Mrs. Caplan maintained 
her concerns and asked Cindy's social worker to place her 
elsewhere.4 
In March of 1983 Cindy and her sister were taken from the 
Caplan home and placed for adoption in another home. In Janu-
ary, 1984, several months after the adoption process became fi-
nal, Cindy revealed to her adoptive mother the "bad things" 
that Caplan had done to her while she lived in the Caplan 
home. 1I 
In May 1984 Caplan's acts were reported to the police. 
Cindy was interviewed twice by Sheriff's deputies, once with the 
use of anatomically correct dolls. Both officers believed the child 
2. Caplan, 193 Cal. App. 3d 546, 238 Cal. Rptr. 479. This was the second foster 
home in which Cindy and her sister had been placed after being taken from her natural 
parents. The children were removed from the first foster home nine months after their 
arrival due to Cindy's inability to adjust to it. [d. at 547, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 
3. Caplan spent too much "lap time" with Cindy in addition to giving her "long 
embraces and kisses". On one occasion Mrs. Caplan awakened at night and saw him 
coming out of Cindy's bedroom, and on another she got up at 6 a.m. to find Caplan and 
Cindy alone in the hallway with Caplan rubbing Cindy's back. According to Cindy this 
episode was one occasion on which Caplan had her orally copulate him. [d. at 548, 238 
Cal. Rptr. at 481. 
4. [d. at 549, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 481-82. 
5. Cindy had been afraid to mention these incidences before because she was afraid 
that her new parents would think she was bad, reject her and refuse to adopt her. [d. at 
546, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 479. 
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was telling the truth and did not prompt her answers many 
way.6 
Cindy was also reexamined by the Children's Hospital phy-
sician who concluded that Cindy had been sexually abused.7 Af-
ter further investigation Caplan was charged with committing 
six criminal sexual acts against Cindy.8 
At trial9 Cindy contradicted some of her statements to her 
adoptive mother and the Sheriff's deputies about whether 
Caplan had digitally penetrated her after the initial physical ex-
amination. The child was, however, unequivocal and consistant 
in her testimony that on two separate occasions Caplan had her 
orally copulate him. to 
Caplan testified in his own behalf, followed by several de-
fense witnesses.ll A recess in the trial was taken for another 
physical exam in which Cindy's vaginal area was photographed. 
6. [d. at 547, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 
7. The pediatrician reversed her previous negative diagnosis, "stating Cindy's previ-
ous quick responses of no's to any abuse questions were not unusual since she was still in 
the Caplan home." [d. at 547, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 480. 
8. Caplan was charged with committing six criminal acts on Cindy and two acts on 
another girl. The counts were severed on pretrial motion and the counts involving Cindy 
proceeded first. [d. 
9. Capilln, with his attorney's consent, waived a jury trial. [d. 
10. The two occasions were: once in the hallway (supra note 3) and once in a down-
stairs stairwell where the coats and shoes were stored. The second occurrence was inter-
rupted by the sound of another foster child on the stairs. [d. at 544, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 
484. 
11. Caplan's witnesses included a psychiatrist who, after reviewing the material 
about Cindy, concluded that she was emotionally disturbed, and might misperceive, ex-
aggerate, distort, or lie about the episodes. [d. at 557, n.3, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 484, n.3. An 
additional witness, another psychiatrist, concluded that Caplan was not a sexually disor-
dered person. In response the trial court stated in its opinion: 
My experience. . .is a substantial background in the family 
law area with numerous allegations of molestation of children. 
I don't come to this court fresh and new without any concept 
of the kind of allegations and the work of psychiatrists and 
psychologists in the field of alleged child molest. The reason I 
asked ... whether he could define a child molester and 
whether it wasn't true that child molesters come from every 
part of the community and every occupation is because that is 
my honest belief ... [Clhild molesters don't look different 
than other people. Therefore, I don't think that they testify 
differently. I don't think their demeanor is of a great deal of 
value in terms of who is and who is not. 
[d. at 553, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 484. 
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A detailed, enlarged print was provided for the court and further 
expert testimony followed. 
The trial court found the expert testimony conflicting 
enough that he was unable to find Caplan guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt on the four counts which involved penal or digital 
penatration. However, he did find Caplan guilty of two counts of 
oral copulation, or in the alternative, lewd and lascivious acts 
upon a minor.12 
On appeal Caplan contended that the trial court prejudi-
cially erred when it refused to allow discovery and introduction 
into evidence of Cindy's psychiatric history, in addition to aver-
ring that there was inadequate evidence to support the 
convictions. IS 
In refusing discovery and entry into evidence of Cindy's 
psychiatric history, the trial court relied on Evidence Code sec-
tion 1014,14 which provides in pertinent part: "[T]he patient, 
whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and 
to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication 
between patient and psychotherapist .... " The appellate court 
ruled that while the privilege is usually broadly interpreted in 
the patient's favor, it may be overruled in the face of compelling 
state interests. 
In addition, Evidence Code section 1027111 states the privi-
lege does not exist if: "(9a) [t]he patient is a child under the age 
of 16 [and] (b) [t]he psychotherapist had reasonable cause to 
believe that the patient has been the victim of a crime and that 
disclosure of the communicaton is in the best interest of the 
child." 
The appellate court ruled that "the best interests of the 
child" did not mean "the mere allegations of wrongdoing against 
a particular person. Seeking the truth of those allegations would 
appear to be in the best interests of the child for appropriate 
12. [d. at 554, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 484. 
13. [d. at 555, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 485. 
14. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988). 
15. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1027 (West Supp. 1988). 
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treatment."l6 Therefore, the court ruled that Cindy's claim of 
privilege must give way to Caplan's constitutional rights of due 
process, confrontation and cross-examination. 
To determine whether the error was harmless, the court re-
manded the case to the trial court for it to review the evidence 
and determine if it would have changed the outcome, in which 
case a new trial would be ordered. If the evidence would not 
have affected the outcome the trial court was to reinstate the 
guilty verdicts. 
Michele M. Feher* 
B. JUROR MISCONDUCT 
1. Failure of a juror to reveal she was physically abused 
by her husband constituted prejudicial juror miscon-
duct in the trial of a woman accused of killing her hus-
band in self defense. 
People v. Blackwell, 191 Cal. App. 3d 925, 236 Cal. Rptr. 
803 (1st Dist. 1987). In People v. Blackwell, the defendant was 
convicted of second degree murder for killing her husband after 
he physically abused her. The defendant filed a motion for new 
trial contending that the failure of a juror to reveal her personal 
experiences with alcoholism and an abusive husband during voir 
dire constituted prejudicial juror misconduct. The trial court de-
nied her motion and the appellate court reversed. 
The defendant, Sally Ann Blackwell, was convicted of sec-
ond degree murder. She filed a motion for a new trial based on 
the fact that a juror failed to reveal relevant personal informa-
tion during voir dire. The prosecutor argued that no prejudicial 
misconduct had occurred, but did not contest the validity of the 
defendant's statement. The trial court agreed with the prosecu-
tor and denied the motion for new trial. l 
16. Caplan, 193 Cal. App 3d 556, 238 Cal. Rptr. 486. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
1. Voir dire means literally in Latin "to speak the truth." A voir dire examination 
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The defendant was a victim of ongoing physical abuse by 
her husband. He frequently drank and became physically vio-
lent. On the day she shot her husband, he had beaten her and 
threatened to kill her. To prevent further abuse or her own 
death, the defendant shot her husband in self defense.2 
After the trial, a juror declared that her former husband 
was an alcoholic who beat her. She failed to reveal this evidence 
when specifically asked during voir dire.3 The juror stated in her 
post-conviction declaration that, in her opinion, if she was able 
to get out of a similar situation without resorting to violence, the 
defendant could have done the same. The defendant argued that 
she had the constitutional right to have the charges against her 
determined by a fair and impartial jury.· Under California stat-
utes, she had the right to exercise peremptory challenges against 
prospective jurors whom she believed could not be fair and 
impartial. Ii 
The defendant cited People u. Williams. 6 The Williams 
court characterized the peremptory challenge as "a critical safe-
guard of the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury."7 For 
this reason, counsel may use voir dire to aid in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges.8 During voir dire, prospective jurors are 
examined under oath; their truthful responses provide a basis 
for peremptory challenges.9 The defendant argued that trial 
courts rely on the jury selection process to choose an unbiased 
jury. She asserted that this process would be meaningless if pro-
spective jurors responded falsely or deliberately concealed facts 
during voir dire. 1o The defendant also argued that had the juror 
refers to the preliminary examination by the court to determine the qualifications of 
prospective jurors where their competency or interest can be objected to. BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. Blackwell, 191 Cal. App. 3d 925, 927-28, 236 Cal. Rptr. 803, 804 (1987). 
3. [d. at 928, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 804. 
4. U.S. CaNST. AMENDS. VI, XIV, §1, CAL. CaNST., art. 1 §16. 
5. The peremptory challenge is a request made by a party to a judge to exclude 
prospective jurors for which no cause need be stated. The number of such challenges is 
usually prescribed by statute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (5th ed. 1979). CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§1067-70 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988). 
6. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1981). 
7. [d. at 405, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 323, 628 P.2d at 875. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. Blackwell. 191 Cal. App. 3d at 929. 236 Cal. Rptr. at 805. 
11
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responded truthfully during voir dire and defense counsel dis-
covered the juror's bias, she could have exercised her rights to 
challenge the juror. 11 
In California, a juror's intentional concealment of relevant 
facts or giving false responses during voir dire constitutes juror 
misconduct.12 Occurrence of such misconduct raises a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice. IS Further, prejudicial jury misconduct 
constitutes grounds for a new trial,l' Upon review of the record, 
the appellate court found that juror prejudice did exist. There-
fore it held there was a reasonable probability of actual harm to 
the defendant. III On these grounds, the appellate court reversed 
the trial court and granted defendant's motion for new trial. I6 
Te Jung Chang* 
C. COMPOSITION OF A JURY 
1. Battered women are not an identifiable group whose 
representation is essential to a fair jury trial. 
People v. Macioce, 197 Cal. App. 3d 262, 242 Cal. Rptr. 771 
(6th Dist. 1987). In People v. Macioce, the California Court of 
Appeal determined that a prosecutor did not commit reversible 
error when he excluded "battered women" from a jury. The 
court held that "battered women" were not an identifiable group 
whose presence is essential to a fair jury trial, and affirmed the 
lower court's conviction of a woman for the murder of her 
husband. 
11. [d. (citing People v. Diaz, 152 Cal. App. 3d 926, 931-39, 200 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80-86 
(1984)). 
12. [d. (citing People v. Pierce, 24 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661, 595 P.2d 
91, 95 (1979)). 
13. A rebuttable presumption of prejudice is a presumption that can be overturned 
with sufficient proof. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (5th ed. 1979). CAL. PENAL CODE 
§1181(3) (West 1985). 
14. [d. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §1181(3)). 
15. [d. 
16. [d. at 932, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 807. 
*Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989 
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Defendant Macioce stabbed and killed her husband. During 
jury selection for her trial, the prosecutor exercised six peremp-
tory challenges! and one challenge for cause.2 Four of the pe-
remptory challenges and the challenge for cause were used to 
exclude women. The defense counsel twice objected to the prose-
cutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude women. In both 
instances, the prosecutor explained his reason for using the pe-
remptory challenge to the trial court's satisfaction. The jury 
which decided Macioce's case consisted of eight men and four 
women. The jury found her guilty of murder in the second 
degree. 
On appeal, Macioce argued, among other things, that the 
prosecutor erred in using his challenges to systematically ex-
clude women, and especially "battered women" from the jury. 
She relied on People u. Wheeler.3 In Wheeler, the California Su-
preme Court reversed the trial court's murder conviction of two 
black men accused of killing a white man. During jury selection, 
the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges to strike every 
black person from the jury. The California Supreme Court held 
that the systematic exclusion of all black people from the jury 
on the basis of group bias violated the defendants' rights to a 
fair jury trial by a "representative cross-section of the commu-
nity."· However, the supreme court went on to say, "[T]his does 
not mean that members of such a group are immune from pe-
remptory challenges ... Nor does it mean that a party will be 
entitled to a petit jury that proportionately represents every 
group in the community."1i 
In the Macioce case, the court rejected the argument that 
she was denied a fair jury comprised of a representative cross-
section of the community. The court refused to recognize "bat-
1. The peremptory challenge is a request made by a party to a judge to exclude 
prospective jurors for which no cause need be stated. The number of such challenges is 
usually prescribed by statute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. A challenge for cause is a request made by a party to a judge that a prospective 
juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury for specified causes or reasons. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979). 
3. People v. Macioce, 197 Cal. App. 3d 262, 277, 242 Cal. Rptr. 771, 781 (citing Peo-
ple v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978». 
4. [d. (quoting Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 
903). 
5. [d. (quoting Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903). 
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tered women" as an identifiable group of persons. The court re-
lied on People v. Fields6 to help define an identifiable group of 
persons. The Fields court stated that "persons previously ar-
rested, crime victims, believers in law and order, etc. are not 
identifiable groups whose representation is essential to a consti-
tutional venire."7 The Macioce court reasoned that since "bat-
tered women" were victims of crime, they were not an identifi-
able group under the Fields8 exclusion. 
Additionally, the court cited Rubio v. Superior Court9 in 
which the California Supreme Court held that an "identifiable 
group" must fulfill two requirements: first, its members must 
share a common perspective arising from their experiences as 
members of the group, and second, the party seeking to prove a 
violation of the cross-section rule has the burden of showing 
other members of the community cannot adequately represent 
the attitudes of the group assertedly excluded.1o The court con-
cluded that since there was no showing that the viewpoints of 
battered women cannot be adequately represented by unbat-
tered women, Macioce was not denied a jury comprised of a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community.ll 
Te Jung Chang* 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Property and custody settlements may be vacated by 
the trial court if it finds that the contesting parties' 
6. [d. at 278, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 781 (citing People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 673 P.2d 
680, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1983)). 
7. [d. (quoting Fields, 35 Cal. 3d at 348, 673 P.2d at 691, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 814). 
8. People v. Macioce, 197 Cal. App. 3d 262, 279, 242 Cal. Rptr. 771, 782. 
9. [d. (citing Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 
734 (1979)). 
10. [d. (citing Rubio 24 Cal. 3d at 98, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737). 
11. Macioce, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 782. 
• Golden Gate University, School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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consent to the settlement was coerced. 
In re Marriage of Brockman, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 240 
Cal. Rptr. 96 (2nd Dist. 1987). In In re Marriage of Brockman, 
the court of appeal held that property and custody settlements 
may be vacated by the trial court if it finds that the contesting 
parties' consent to the settlement was coerced. 
In 1984, the plaintiff, Debra D. Brockman, filed for divorce. 
in Pasadena. l The Brockmans had been married five years and 
had a young son. Mrs. Brockman's fourteen year old daughter 
also lived with the couple. 
While on a visit with the children in Sacramento, where 
they were staying with their mother, the defendant, Donald D. 
Brockman, flew the children to Los Angeles and refused to re-
turn them. Some six weeks later the defendant offered to return 
the children to the plaintiff at an upcoming court hearing.2 
At the hearing, defendant threatened to keep the children 
unless the plaintiff gave up all claims to the couple's considera-
ble ($400,000 to $800,000) community property. Plaintiff was al-
lowed to keep $10,000 and a Camero car. Defendant agreed to 
pay child and spousal support totaling $800 per month for ten 
years. If plaintiff agreed to the arrangement she would receive 
sole physical custody of the chiidren and an agreement from the 
defendant that he would forfeit a $100,000 note if he ever con-
tested the custody or support order. Defendant's attorney wrote 
out the agreement by hand and plaintiff signed it in the court-
house hallway.8 
Plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment in its entirety four 
months after it was signed on the ground that the settlement 
terms were coerced.4 This appeal followed a denial of the motion 
1. When plaintiff filed for divorce, she also obtained an ex parte restraining order to 
prevent her estranged husband from coming within 100 yards of herself or the children. 
The defendant had a history of violence. Plaintiff never served the order on defendant. 
Defendant shortly thereafter started his own divorce proceedings in Burbank. Brockman, 
194 Cal. App. 3d at 1039, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 97. 
2. Id. at 1040, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 97. 
3.Id. 
4. Id. The final judgment was entered eight months after the courthouse agreement. 
Plaintiff objected to provisions which were not agreed upon and defendant did not op-
15
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to vacate. 
The court of appeal held that while the general rule is that 
the denial of a motion to vacate is not an appealable order,'1 an 
exception exists when there is no effective appeal from the judg-
ment. If the complained of error occurs at the time the judgment 
is entered or afterward, the record will not reveal the grounds 
for appeal. Thus, a motion to vacate is the only way to bring the 
court's attention to the issue or make a record for appeal. Under 
such circumstances the denial of the motion to vacate becomes 
appealable. 
The court agreed with plaintiff that the exception was ap-
plicable since there was no record of duress when the judgment 
was entered and it was only via the motion to vacate that the 
issues of duress and coercion could be raised. 
The court disagreed with defendant's contention that an ap-
peal could not be taken from a consent judgment. If duress or 
coercion influenced the terms of the settlement then the plain-
tiff's requisite free will was absent rendering the "consent" void. 
The defendant also contended that plaintiff's appeal was 
barred because of the delay in bringing the motion and in the 
intervening months she accepted the benefits of the judgment.6 
In rejecting the defendant's argument the court relied on In 
re Marriage of Fonstein.7 The California Supreme Court case 
held that mere acceptance of benefit does not bar appeal if the 
apeUant would still be entitled to them in the event of a rever-
sal. The court of appeal stated that it was inconceivable in this 
case that the benefits accepted by the plaintiff ($10,000, a Ca-
mero car, and modest support) would be reduced on remand.8 
pose the plaintiff's changes. Four months after the judgment was entered, the plaintiff, 
having changed counsel, moved to vacate the judgment in its entirety. Id. 
5. If an original judgment is appealable, allowing an appeal for a motion to vacate 
results in two appeals from the same decision. Also, the possibility of an unfair extension 
of the period in which one may file an appeal would occur if no timely appeal has been 
made. Brockman, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1040, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 97. 
6. Id. at 1044, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 99. 
7. Id. at 1044, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 99 (citing Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 552 P.2d 1169, 
131 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1976)). 
8. Id. at 1045, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The court had previously disposed of the par-
ties' attempt to bind by contract their custody agreement. The court held that the best 
16
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Having established the plaintiff's right to appeal the court 
concluded that the trial court was in error when it failed to de-
cide on the merits: whether plaintiff's consent to the settlement 
was coerced. The trial court erroneously relied on In re Mar-
riage of Stevenot9 for the proposition that once a settlement 
agreement is incorporated into a judgment, only extrinsic fraud 
may set it aside. 
The court of appeal stated that while Steve not represented 
an attempt to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud 
the case itself recognizes that while duress is neither extrinsic 
nor intrinsic fraud it is a sufficient ground to set aside a judg-
ment. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial court 
to determine if the plaintiff's consent was coerced. 
Michele M. Feher* 
interests of the child always come first and, therefore, any agreements between parents 
that attempt to divest the court of jurisdiction over minor children are void as against 
public policy. [d. at 1041, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 98. 
9. The court quoted Stevenot, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1051, 202 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1984), at 
length to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud: 
The primary architect of California's laws on the extrinsic-in-
trinsic fraud issue in family law cases has been one of its judi-
cial superstars, Justice Roger Traynor. Over 40 years ago, Jus-
tice Traynor wrote, "The final judgment of a court having 
jurisdiction over persons and subject matter can be attacked 
in equity after the time for appeal or other direct attack has 
expired only if the alleged fraud or mistake is extrinsic rather 
than intrinsic [citations). Fraud or mistake is extrinsic when it 
deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to present 
his case to the court [citations). If an unsuccessful party to an 
action has been kept in ignorance thereof [citations) or has 
been prevented from fully participating therein [citations], 
there has been no true adversary proceeding, and the judg-
ment is open to attack at any time. A party who has been 
given proper notice of an action, however, and who has not 
been prevented from full participation therein, has had an op-
portunity to present his case to the court and to protect him-
self from any fraud attempted by his adversary. [Citations). 
Fraud perpetrated under such circumstances is intrinsic. 
Brockman, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1046, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 101 (quoting Stevenot, 154 
Cal. App. 3d 1061, 202 Cal. Rptr. 123). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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2. Failure of a business is an insufficient ground for modi-
fication of child and spousal support awards. 
In re Marriage of Norvall, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 237 Cal. 
Rptr. 770 (5th Dist. 1987). In In re Marriage of Norvall, the 
court of appeal held that the failure of a former husband's busi-
ness did not fall under any of the "exceptional circumstances" 
requirements of the Agnos Child Support Standards Act. 1 
Therefore, a business failure was an insufficient ground for mod-
ification of child and spousal support awards. 
The trial court granted the husband's petition for modifica-
tion of child and spousal support based on economic hardship. 
Reviewing the wife's appeal, the court discussed the issue of 
whether the award was properly modified. 
The plaintiff, Nancy Norvall, and defendant, Robert 
Norvall, were divorced on October 29, 1984. In their settlement 
agreement, custody of the two minor children would be shared. 
In addition, the husband agreed to pay $350 per month per child 
in support. He also agreed to pay Nancy $1,900 per month in 
spousal support. In the agreement, Robert received The Country 
Gourmet Restaurant business subject to all its debts. After the 
orders were entered, the restaurant failed, resulting in large 
debts for the husband and his current wife. The defendant then 
filed an order to show cause for modification of child and 
spousal support. The trial court granted his request for modifi-
cation. It cited as grounds for modification the defendant's eco-
nomic hardship and the fact that the children were with their 
father forty-four percent of the time. The trial court ordered the 
defendant to pay $219.52 per month per child in child support, 
and $1,056 per month in spousal support. 
The court of appeal stated that the legislative intent of the 
Agnos Act was to provide a "single standard to promote equita-
ble, adequate child support awards." In the recognition of the 
potential impact this would have on child support awards, the 
legislature passed California Civil Code section 4730 which per-
mits the automatic review of all child support awards ordered 
1. CAL. CIV. CODE §§4720-4732 (West Supp. 1988). 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss3/5
1988] SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW 607 
prior to July 1, 1985, the effective date of the act.2 Since the 
original support order fell within the parameters of section 4730, 
it created an automatic basis for review. 
Under the Agnos Act, a mandatory minimum child support 
is determined by a standard formula. 3 The calculated amount of 
support is dependant on the supporting spouse's net disposable 
income:' The court may also deduct certain unusual amounts 
from gross income to determine net income in cases of "extreme 
financial hardship."1! These circumstances under section 4725 in-
clude examples of extraordinary health expenses, catastrophic 
losses, and minimum basic living expenses of either parent's de-
pendant minor children from other marriages or relationships.6 
In modifying the child support award, the trial court de-
ducted $977 per month of husband's net disposable income, the 
amount he used directly in relation to his failed business. The 
appellate court determined that this money was wrongfully de-
ducted because these payments did not fall under either the cat-
egory of "exceptional circumstance" or "catastrophic losses." 
The court said that the wording and legislative history of section 
4725 suggests business losses cannot be classified as a type of 
extreme financial hardship, and therefore, qualify as a deduction 
under section 4725.7 
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §4730 (West Supp. 1988). 
3. CAL. CIV. CODE §4722 (West Supp. 1988). The standard formula provided in sec-
tion 4722 consists of multiplying the combined net monthly income of both parents by a 
designated percentage factor based on the number of children. The amount each parent 
contributes to the mandatory minimum award is determined by multiplying the mini-
mum award by the proportionate share of the parents' contribution to their combined 
net disposable income. 
4. CAL. CIV. CODE §4721 (West Supp. 1988). Section 4721(c) provides that the annual 
net disposable income of each parent shall be computed by deducting from each parent's 
annual gross income actual amounts attributable to only the following: state and federal 
income tax, deductions attributed to the employee's contribution or self-employed 
worker's contribution pursuant to the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), de-
ductions for mandatory union dues and retirement benefits, provided that they are re-
quired as a condition of employment, deductions for health insurance premiums and 
state disability insurance premiums, and any child or spousal support actually being paid 
by the parent pursuant to a court order, to or for the benefit of any person who is not a 
subject of the award to be established by the court. 
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §4725 (West Supp. 1988). 
6. CAL. CIV. CODE §4725(aHb) (West Supp. 1988). 
7. In re Marriage of Norvall, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1055, 237 Cal. Rptr. 770, 775 
(1987). 
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The appellate court determined that the trial court also 
erred by basing its deductions from the awarded amount of sup-
port on the amount of time the children spent with the husband 
under shared physical custody. The trial court multiplied the 
full amount of the award by forty-four percent and subtracted 
this figure from the full amount to determine the actual award. 
The court of appeal stated that the legislature did not intend for 
parental contributions of child support under Civil Code section 
4727 to be pro rata8 calculations which are applied mechani-
cally.9 
The court stated that in order to modify a spousal support 
order, the moving party must show a material change of circum-
stance since the time of the order. 10 Here, the court did not find 
a material change in circumstance on the part of the defendant. 
It determined that he was better off financially since his busi-
ness failed. Furthermore, the defendant's income was increased 
by the contributions of his present wife's income. 
Lastly, the appellate court refused to give merit to the hus-
band's argument that pursuant to California Civil Code section 
4801, the court was justified in reducing wife's award.ll Civil 
Code section 4801 provides that in making an award for the dis-
solution of marriage, it could account for the earning capacity of 
the spouse. The defendant argued that plaintiff's education and 
career skills were justification for such modification. The court 
determined that this argument was invalid since the wife pos-
sessed these skills ,at the time of the original settlement 
agreement. 
Te Jung Chang* 
8. Pro rata calculations are prepared according to a certain rate, percentage, or pro-
portion of a given amount. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (5th ed. 1979). 
9. In re Marriage of Norvall, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 777. 
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §4727 (West Supp. 1988). 
11. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801 (West Supp. 1988). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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3. Wife is entitled to share in that part of husband's mili-
tary pension which is community property. 
In re Marriage of Floweree, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1438, 241 Cal. 
Rptr. 307 (4th Dist. 1987). In In re Marriage of Floweree, the 
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision de-
nying a wife's motion to divide the military pension of her for-
mer spouse as community property under California Civil Code 
Section 5124.1 
Frances and Robert Floweree were married in 1957; they 
were divorced on November 30, 1982. Prior to the final judgment 
for the dissolution of marriage, they entered into a property set-
tlement agreement which provided in part, "[N]either of us will 
have a claim based on any assets whether disclosed or undis-
closed which are only subsequently declared to be community 
property by any court or legislature."2 The settlement agree-
ment did not discuss the disposition of Robert's military retire-
ment benefits. 
1. California Civil Code §5124, repealed on January I, 1986, provided in its entirety: 
(a) Community property settlements, judgments, or de-
crees that became final on or after June 25, 1981, and before 
February I, 1983, may be modified to include a division of mil-
itary retirement benefits payable on or after February I, 1983, 
in a manner consistent with federal law and the law of this 
state as it existed before February I, 1983. 
(b) Modification of community property settlements, 
judgments, or decrees under this section may be granted 
whether or not the property settlement, judgment, or decree 
expressly reserved the pension for further determination, 
omitted any reference to a military pension, or assumed in any 
manner implicitly or otherwise, that a pension divisible as 
community property before June 25, 1981, and on or after 
February I, 1983, was not, as of the date the property settle-
ment, judgment, or decree became final, divisible community 
property. 
(c) Any proceeding brought pursuant to this section shall 
be brought before January I, 1986. 
(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 
I, 1986, and on that date is repealed unless a later enacted 
statute which is chaptered before that date deletes or extends 
that date. 
(Deering 1984) 
2. In re Marriage of Floweree, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1438, 1441, 241 Cal. Rptr. 307, 308 
(1987). 
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On October 4, 1985, Frances filed a motion pursuant to Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 5124 to divide Robert's military retire-
ment benefits payable after February 1, 1983. Robert opposed 
her motion arguing that Frances had waived any claim to his 
military benefits in their settlement agreement. The trial court 
agreed with Robert, and denied her request. Frances appealed. 
The court of appeal held that Frances did not waive her 
rights to Robert's military pension because the pension was al-
ways commu.lity property, and was not "subsequently declared" 
community property by the legislature. The court rejected Rob-
ert's argument that the United States Supreme Court decision 
in McCarty v. McCarty changed the character of his pension 
from community property to separate property.3 In McCarty, 
the Court held that federal law precluded a state court from di-
viding military nondisability retirement benefits pursuant to 
community property laws.· The California Court of Appeal, 
however, held that McCarty was a preemption case.1I The appel-
late court stated the McCarty holding was based on a conflict 
between community property principals and the federal retire-
ment scheme.8 Therefore, McCarty did not change the commu-
nity property nature of Robert's military benefits, but only pre-
vented its division under federal law. 
However, in response to the widespread judicial and legisla-
tive drive to invalidate McCarty, Congress enacted the Federal 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (FUSF-
SPA),7 effective February 1, 1983. The FUSFSPA allows courts 
to treat military retirement benefits in accordance with the mar-
ital property laws of its jurisdiction. California then enacted sec-
tion 5124 of the civil code to regulate and modify the disposition 
of judgments, decrees, or property settlements for the period be-
tween the date of McCarty and FUSFPSA, eradicating the ef-
fects of McCarty.8 
In affirming a wife's community property rights to her for-
3. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). 
4. Id. at 223-36. 
5. In re Marriage of Floweree, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1442, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 309. 
6. Id, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 309. 
7. 10 U.S.C. Sections 1401-08 (1985). 
8. In re Marriage of Floweree, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 1443, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 310. 
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mer husband's military retirement benefits, the California Court 
of Appeal upheld both federal and state legislative policy to pro-
vide for fair disposition of property acquired by either spouse 
during the course of a marital relationship. 
Te Jung Chang* 
B. REVERSE PATERNITY SUITS 
1. California law recognizes the conclusive presumption 
that a husband cohabiting with his wife is the father of 
her child. 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. 
Rptr. 810 (2nd Dist. 1987). In Michael H. v. Gerald D., a wife's 
lover brought a reverse paternity suit against her family. The 
California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision 
granting the husband's motion for summary judgment. The 
court determined that there was no triable issue of fact. The 
court asserted that the law recognizes a conclusive presumption 
that a husband cohabiting with his wife is the father of his wife's 
child. 
Plaintiff, Michael H., brought this reverse paternity action 
against defendants, Carole D., her husband Gerald D., and Vic-
toria D., the child. The plaintiff sought to establish himself as 
the biological father of Victoria D. He also wanted to establish a 
father/child relationship with Victoria D. The court appointed a 
guardian ad litem attorneyl to represent Victoria's interests in 
the action. Her guardian filed a cross-complaint to establish a 
legal or de facto relationship with Gerald D. and/or Michael H.2 
Gerald D. moved for summary judgment on the ground there is 
no triable issue of fact regarding the application of California 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
1. A guardian ad litem is an officer appointed by the court to represent the interests 
of a minor or a legally incompetent person in litigation to which she is a party. BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 635 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. A de facto relationship is one which must be accepted for all practical puposes 
but is illegal or illegitimate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (5th ed. 1979). 
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Evidence Code section 621, subdivision (a), which provides that 
a child born to a married woman while cohabiting with her hus-
band, who is not impotent or sterile, is a child of that marriage.3 
The trial court granted the motion, and Michael H. and Victoria 
D. separately appealed. 
Carole and Gerald D. were married May 9, 1976. While still 
married and living together as husband and wife, Carole con-
ceived and gave birth to Victoria D. on May 11, 1981. Carole D. 
had an extramarital affair with Michael H. during the period she 
conceived Victoria. On October 29, 1981, Carole D., Michael H. 
and Victoria D. had blood tests done at the University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles. These tests show that there is a 98.07 per-
cent probability that Michael H. is Victoria D.'s biological fa-
ther. On November 18, 1982, Michael H. filed the instant action. 
Carole D. and Gerald D. were still married and living together 
with Victoria D. at the time the action was commenced. 
The court of appeal found the triable issue of fact needed to 
invoke the conclusive presumption of section 6214 was not estab-
lished. It stated the conclusive presumption is a codification of 
the social policy that, given a certain relationship between hus-
band and wife, the husband is held responsible for the child, and 
the familiy unit should not be impugned.1I In addition, the rule 
protects the child from the social stigma of illegitimacy.6 
Both Victoria D. and Michael H. asserted that section 621 
prevents them from establishing a biological parent-child rela-
tionship, violating their protected due process liberty interests.7 
The court weighed the competing private and state interests to 
determine whether section 621 protects Victoria and Michael's 
interests.6 The court determined that Victoria D. and Michael 
3. CAL. EVID. CODE §621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988) 
4. A conclusive presumption is one in which proof of a basic fact makes the exis-
tence of the presumed fact conclusive and irrebutable. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
5. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1005, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816 
(1987) (citing Kulsior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603 at 619, 354 P.2d 657, 658, Cal. Rptr. 129, 
140 (1960)). 
6. Id. at 1005, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (1987) (citing In re Marriage of B., 124 Cal. 
App. 3d 524, 529-30, 177 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432 (1981)). 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, section 1 provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
8. Michael H., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (1987). 
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H. were not denied due process. The court decided that the state 
interest in preserving the integrity of the matrimonial family 
and protecting the child's welfare by preserving established par-
ent-child relationships is more significant than Michael's inter-
est in establishing that he is the biological parent of Victoria D.9 
Te Jung Chang* 
C. CHILD BEARING 
1. Business & Professional Code section 2063 provides a 
religious practice exception to the midwifery certifica-
tion statutes. 
Northrup v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 3d 276, 237 Cal. 
Rptr. 255 (3rd. Dist. 1987). In Northrup v. Superior Court, the 
petitioners, Geneva Northrup and Julia Young, were charged 
with violating California Business and Professions Code sections 
2052, 2053 and 2505: practicing midwifery without proper certifi-
cation. I The petitioners are members of a religious sect which 
9. [d. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West Supp. 1988) provides: 
Any person who practices or attempts to practice, or who ad-
vertises or holds himself or herself out as practicing, any sys-
tem or mode of treating the sick or afflicted in this state, or 
who diagnoses, treats, operates for, or prescribes for any ail-
ment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder, in-
jury, or other physical or mental condition of any person, 
without having at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked or 
unsuspended certificate as provided in this chapter, or without 
being authorized to perform such act pursuant to a certificate 
obtained in accordance with some other provision of law, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053 (West Supp. 1988) provides: 
Any person who willfully, under circumstances or conditions 
which cause or create risk of great bodily harm, serious physi-
calor mental illness, or death, practices or attempts to prac-
tice, or advertises or holds himself or herself out as practicing, 
any system or mode of treating the sick or afflicted in this 
state, or diagnoses, treats, operates for, or prescribes for any 
ailment, blemish, deformity, disease, disfigurement, disorder, 
injury, or other physical or mental condition of any person, 
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forbids its members from obtaining medical assistance. The Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal issued a writ of prohibition directing the 
superior court to dismiss the informations against the petition-
ers2 and refrain from taking any further action in the cases. 
The court found merit in the petitioner's contention that 
they were exempt from the certification requirements of Busi-
ness and Professions Code, division 2, chapter 5, the Medical 
Practice Act. The court held that the plain, unambiguous lan-
guage of section 2063 provides the petitioners with a "religious 
practice exemption" from the certification requirements.s 
Additionally, the court stated that the legislative intent to 
give priority to its citizens religious beliefs over the state's inter-
est in licensing medical practice was clear from the face of the 
statute.· 
without having at the time of doing so a valid, unrevoked, and 
unsuspended certificate as provided in this chapter, or without 
being authorized to perform that act pursuant to a certificate 
obtained in accordance with some other provision of law, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not exceed-
ing one year or in the state prison. The remedy provided in 
this section shall not preclude any other remedy provided by 
law. 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2505 (West 1974 & Supp. 1988) authorizes and defines the 
practice of midwifery: 
The certificate to practice midwifery authorizes the holder to 
attend cases of normal childbirth. As used in this chapter, the 
practice of midwifery constitutes the furthering or undertak-
ing by any person to assist a woman in normal childbirth, but 
it does not include the use of any instrument at any child-
birth, except such instrument as is necessary in severing the 
umbilical cord, nor does it include the assisting of childbirth 
by any artifical, forcible, or mechanical means, nor the per-
formance of any version, nor the removal of adherent pla-
centa, nor the administering, prescribing, advising, or employ-
ing, either before or after any childbirth, of any drug, other 
than a disinfectant or cathartic .... 
2. The writ petitions of Northrup and Young were consolidated on motion from the 
People. The court on its own consolidated the petitions for purposes of decision as well 
as hearing. Northrup, 192 Cal. App. 3d 278, n.2, 237 Cal. Rptr. 256, n.2. 
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2063 (West Supp. 1988). 
4. The court stated that the People's reliance on Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 
Cal. 3d 479, 556 P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976), was misplaced since in the instant 
case neither the validity of the midwifery statutes nor the state's interests in certification 
were being challenged. Instead, the instant case tests the scope of the "religious practice 
exemption" which was not addressed in Bowland. Northrup, 192 Cal. App. 3d 282, 237 
Cal. Rptr. 257. 
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Section 2063 provides in part: "Nothing in this chapter 
[The Medical Practice Act] shall be construed so as to ... regu-
late, prohibit, or apply to any kind of treatment by prayer, nor 
interfere IN ANY WAY with the practice of religion." (Emphasis in 
opinion).1i 
The Church of the First Born is a denomination which ar-
rived in the United States with the Mayflower pilgrims and con-
tinues today with 150 congregations throughout the country. Its 
members shun the use of medical professionals and "rely on the 
power of God" to assist in illness. During childbirth church 
members use "helpers" or "attendants," who are also church 
members, to assist with delivery. The petitioners are acknowl-
edged by the church as having received a "divine calling" to be 
helpers and are recognized as such by the church.8 
The midwife certification requirements, which dictate the 
close association of midwife and medical doctor,7 are contrary to 
the petitioners' religious beliefs. Helpers cannot consult physi-
cians without violating both the helpers' and the expectant 
mothers' religious beliefs. 
Thus, the court held that the petitioners were exempt from 
the certification requirements (section 2505) and could not be 
prosecuted under sections 2052 and 2053 when practicing as 
helpers attending to other church members. However, the court 
emphasized the narrow scope of the section 2063 "religious prac-
tice exemption," which is expressly limited to the Medical Prac-
tice Act, and stated that exemption does not protect the peti-
tioners from possible criminal prosecution.8 
5. Northrup, 192 Cal. App. 3d 282, 237 Cal. Rptr. 259. Disciplinary action is taken 
against any midwife who fails to notify a physician under certain enumerated circum-
stances during pregnancy or childbirth. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2509-2513 (West 1974 
& Supp. 1988). 
6. [d. at 279, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 257. 
7. [d. at 281, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 258. 
8. Since two of the three births, which formed the bases of the charges, resulted in 
still births, the court suggested that criminal sanctions may be available to the state. 
Although the absence of a midwifery license alone could not support a criminal prosecu-
tion, a second degree murder charge may lie if a conscious disregard for human life is 
demonstrated. Northrup, 192 Cal. App. 3d 283, 237 Cal. Rptr. 259-60 (citing People v. 
Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 300, 637 P.2d 279, 289, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52 (1981». 
It may be possible to prosecute on a charge of involuntary manslaughter if a lack of 
due care can be shown. [d. at 283, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 
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The court's suggestion that criminal sanctions may be ap-
propriate in cases of stillbirth would seem to undermine the leg-
islative intent of the "religious practice exemption." The state 
relinquishes the right to standardize the educational background 
of religious practitioners when it exempts them from certifica-
tion requirements. Criminal prosecution of religious practition-
ers in the absence of intentional misconduct (which the facts do 
not suggest) makes the "religious practice exemption" for mid-
wifery certification meaningless and circumvents the religious 
practioner's right to practice midwifery uncertified. 
Michele M. Feher* 
III. TORT LAW 
A. FRAUD AND DECEIT 
1. Public policy prohibits actions in fraud and deceit for 
the misrepresentation of intent to impregnate. 
Perry v. Atkinson, 195 Cal. App. 3d 14, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402 
(4th Dist. 1987). In Perry v. Atkinson, the court of appeal held 
that public policy prohibited a cause of action for fraud and de-
ceit brought by a woman against a married man who misrepre-
sented his intentions to provide her with the means to have a 
child. 
Atkinson, while married to another woman, had an intimate 
relationship with Perry for over a year. When Perry became 
pregnant Atkinson urged her to have an abortion, promising 
that he would reimpregnate her a year later either through sex-
ual relations or by artificial insemination. 1 
Following an abortion that she did not want, Perry learned 
that Atkinson never intended to keep his promise to reim-
pregnate her. She became depressed, required psychiatric treat-
(West 1970 & Supp. 1988)). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
1. Perry, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 16, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 403. 
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ment, lost six months of earnings and incurred large medical 
expenses.2 
Perry sued Atkinson for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, fraud and deceit.3 The trial court sustained without 
leave to amend Atkinson's demurrer to Perry's fraud and deceit 
action stating that such a cause of action would constitute an 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting an 
individual's right to privacy and would be contra to public 
policy.' 
In deciding that Perry had no cause of action for fraud and 
deceit the court of appeal stated that the specific conduct giving 
rise to such a claim must be examined. The court relied on the 
reasoning of Stephen K. v. Roni L.r> to hold that there is no 
cause of action for the fradulent breach of a promise to 
impregnate. 
In Stephen K., the defendant-father in a paternity action 
cross-complained against the plaintiff-mother alleging that she 
had misrepresented her use of contraception and in reliance the 
defendant had sexual relations with the plaintiff which resulted 
in the birth of a child he did not want. 
The court held that the misrepresentation was not actiona-
ble, stating "although Roni may have lied and betrayed the per-
sonal confidence reposed in her by Stephen, the circumstances 
and the highly intimate nature of the relationship wherein the 
false representations may have occurred, are such that a court 
should not define any standard of conduct therefor."6 
The court further stated that to allow such a claim would 
2.Id. 
3. During the trial of the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, 
Perry accepted a $250,000 settlement of the case. Id. at 17, n.2, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 403, n.2. 
4. The trial court improperly granted a summary adjudication as to the fraud and 
deceit cause of action in her first amended complaint. The court of appeal treated the 
summary adjudication order as void. The court considered Perry's appeal from the sus· 
taining of a demurrer without leave to amend on her second amended complaint. Id. at 
18, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 404. 
5. Perry, 195 Cal. App. 3d 18, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (citing Stephen K., 105 Cal. 
App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980)). 
6. Id. at 18, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 404·05 (citing Stephen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d 643, 164 
Cal. Rptr. 620). 
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require "the court to supervise the promises made between two 
consenting adults as to circumstances of their private sexual 
conduct. To do so would encourage unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to 
privacy."7 
The court of appeal was also persuaded by two sections of 
the California Civil Code, which recognize that public policy pre-
cludes certain sexual conduct and interpersonal decisions from 
tort liability.s 
No cause of action exists for alienation of affection, seduc-
tion of a person over the age of consent, or the breach of a prom-
ise to marry.9 Additionally, causes of action for fraudulent 
promises to marry or cohabitate after marriage are precluded 
from tort liability.lo 
The court reasoned, "[i]f no cause of action can exist in tort 
for a fraudulent promise to fulfill the rights, duties and obliga-
tions of a marriage relationship, then logically no cause of action 
can exist for a fraudulent promise by a married man to impreg-
nate a woman not his wife."l1 
The court then disposed of the cases on which Perry had 
relied to argue that Atkinson's right of privacy must give way to 
her right to protection from and compensation for physical harm 
and to the government's interest in protecting the health and 
welfare of its citizens. 
In Barbara A. v. John G.,12 a woman sued the man who had 
impregnated her for misrepresenting his infertility to her. The 
resulting ectopic pregnancy caused her to suffer physical and fi-
nancial injuries. 
The court in Barbara A. held that the woman could state a 
7. [d. at 18-19, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (citing Stephen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d 644-45, 
164 Cal. Rptr. 620). 
8. [d. at 19, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 405. 
9. CAL. CIY. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982). 
10. CAL. CIY. CODE § 43.3 (West 1982). 
11. Perry, 195 Cal. App. 3d 19, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 405. 
12. [d. at 19, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (citing Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. 
Rptr. 422 (1983)). 
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cause of action for battery and deceit. The court attempted to 
distinguish Stephen K. on the ground that no child was involved 
and the public policy considerations regarding parental obliga-
tions were absent in the case. IS The court of appeal disagreed 
that the cases were distinguishable and chose to follow the rea-
soning of Stephen K.14 
In Kathleen K. u. Robert B./6 a woman sued a man because 
she contracted genital herpes from him through sexual inter-
course. The court allowed an action, cited Barbara A., and held 
that the constitutional right to privacy did not protect the de-
fendant from liability when he failed to inform her he was in-
fected with a veneral disease. 
The court in Perry reasoned that Kathleen K. was distin-
guishable because "[t]he tortious transmission of a contagious 
disease implicates policy considerations beyond the sexual con-
duct and procreative decisions of two consenting adults . . . . 
The absence of such policy consideration here compels a differ-
ent result."ls In disallowing this type of action the court is dis-
couraging, on public policy grounds, governmental intrustion 
into private sexual and reproductive decisions. 
Michele M. Feher* 
B. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
1. Homosexual relationships fail, as a matter of law, to 
establish the "close relationship" requirement in ac-
tions for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
Coon u. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 
(4th Dist. 1987). In Coon u. Joseph, the court of appeal held 
13. [d. at 19·20, n.2, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 405 (citing Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d 378, 
193 Cal. Rptr. 429). 
14. [d. at 20, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 406. 
15. [d. at 20, 240 Cal. Rptr. 406, (citing Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 273 (1984». 
16. [d. at 21, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 406. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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that in actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as a 
matter of law, homosexual relationships fail to establish the 
"close relationship" requirement under Dillon v. Legg. 1 The 
plaintiff alleged that he attempted to board a San Francisco mu-
nicipal bus but was denied access. The driver allowed his life-
partner, Robert Ervin, on the bus and then, in the plaintiff's 
presence, the driver verbally abused and struck Ervin in the 
face. 2 
The court split in its reasoning but was unanimous in judg-
ment. A lengthy partial dissent was written by Presiding Justice 
White. Justice White disagreed that homosexual relationships 
failed as a matter of law to fit the Legg criteria. 
A short concurrence by Associate Justice Barry-Deal chal-
lenged the legislature "to examine the question whether people 
in committed relationships, both heterosexual and homosexual, 
other than those meeting the legal requirements for marriage, 
should be accorded recognition giving rise to all, or selected, le-
1. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 874 (citing Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 
728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968». 
2. The complaint alleged three causes of action in addition to negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. The court of appeal held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1273, 237 Cal. Rptr. 
at 875. 
The court relied on Ochoa u. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1216, 216 Cal. 
Rptr. 661 (1985). In that case, the plaintiffs (parents of the decedent) suffered extreme 
emotional and mental distress when they witnessed the deterioration of their son's 
health while he was confined in a juvenile facility. The son eventually died. 
Ochoa held the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct 
that is especially calculated to cause the plaintiff distress. Id. at 165, n.5, 703 P.2d at 4, 
n.5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 664, n.5. 
Therefore, the court in Coon stated that the bus driver's actions were not especially 
calculated to cause distress to the plaintiff and ruled that the plaintiff's claim must fail. 
Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1273, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The complainant also alleged that 
he had a cause of action for negligence under CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 1985) and a' 
cause of action under CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) for the violation of 
his civil rights. Section 2100 codifies the duty of commercial carriers to provide safe car-
riage to its passengers. Section 51.7 provides that persons should be free from violence, 
intimidation or threats because of race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. The court 
gave short shrift to these other claims. 
The court ruled that the plaintiff never became a passenger on the bus and therefore 
did not trigger any duty owed to him under § 2100. The court also ruled that the bus 
driver's threatening behavior was not directed at the plaintiff but at the plaintiff's signif-
icant other and therefore plaintiff had no cause of action under § 51.7 in his own right. 
Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1277, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
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gal rights traditionally reserved to married persons."3 
In Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court held that a 
mother who saw her child run down and killed had a cause of 
action although she herself was in a completely safe position at 
the time.· The court ruled that a defendant owed a reasonably 
forseeable bystander a duty of care. Courts were to use three 
factors to determine forseeability: 
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene 
of the accident as contrasted with one who was a 
distance from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted 
from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff 
from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident, as contrasted with learning 
of the accident from others after its occurrence. 
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely 
related, as contrasted with the absence of any re-
lationship or the presence of only a distant 
relationship.o 
The majority in Coon held that as a matter of law homo-
sexual relationships do not meet the third criteria. The court 
stated that "the inclusion of an intimate homosexual relation-
ship with the 'close relationship' standard would render ambiva-
lent and weaken the necessary limits on a tortfeasor's liability 
mandated by Dillon."6 
The court stated that the social policy to limit recovery to 
husband-wife, parent-child, or grandchild-grandparent relation-
ships has been observed by California courts of appeal with two 
recent exceptions. The first exception, Krivenstov v. San Rafael 
Taxicabs, allowed recovery for an uncle-nephew relationship af-
ter considering the closeness of the relationship between the 
two.7 The second case, Ledger v. Tippitt, allowed recovery to an 
unmarried female who observed the murder of her cohabitant, 
3. Id. at 1278, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
4. Id. at 1274, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 875 (citing Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)). 
5. Id. at 1274, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76 (citing Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d 740, 441 P.2d 920, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 80). 
6. Id. at 1275, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877. 
7. Id. at 1275, n.1, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877, n.l., (citing Kriuenstou, 186 Cal. App. 3d 
1445, 229 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986». 
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the father of her child.8 
The court only footnoted to Kriuenstou, and stated that it 
found Ledger inapposite because a "de facto" marital relation-
ship could never be made in the case of homosexuals who are 
not allowed to legally marry.9 
The partial dissent by Justice White takes issue with the 
majority's holding that homosexual relationships do not qualify 
as a matter of law under the Dillon criteria. Justice White ar-
gued that it was important to remember that the criteria was 
developed to help the court determine who the forseeable plain-
tiff was. 
In Ochoa u. Superior Court,10 the California Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is important to remember that the factors set 
forth in Dillon, were merely guidelines to be used 
in assessing whether the plaintiff was a forseeable 
victim of the defendant's negligence. As we stated 
in Dillon: "We are not now called upon to decide 
whether, in the absence or reduced weight of 
some of the above factors, we would conclude that 
the accident and injury were not reasonably for-
seeable and that therefore defendant owed no 
duty of care to plaintiff. In future cases the courts 
will draw the lines of demarcation upon facts 
more subtle than the compelling ones alleged in 
the complaint before us. "11 
White states that criteria exists to assist courts in determin-
ing whether a relationship is close enough (rendering the plain-
tiff reasonably forseeable) to allow recovery for the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress when a plaintiff witnesses a 
8. [d. at 1276, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (citing Ledger, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210 Cal. 
Rptr. 814 (1985». 
9. Id. at 1277, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877. Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983), 
homosexuals cannot legally marry. The statute requires the proposed marital partners to 
be a man and a woman. This statute has not prevented many private ceremonies cele-
brating homosexual unions. 
10. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1280, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (citing Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 
159, 703 P.2d 1216, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985». 
11. Id. at 1280, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (citing Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 170, 703 P.2d at 8, 
216 Cal. Rptr. at 668). 
34
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss3/5
1988] SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW 623 
particular person injured.12 
In the instant case White stated, "In a contemporary society 
(and particularly in San Francisco) it is forseeable a homosexual 
relationship might exist. Such a relationship may be significant 
enough to meet the third Dillon requirement. "13 
Additionally, White disagrees with the majority's assertion 
that marriage is a requirement of recovery. Citing Ledger, in 
which recovery was granted to an unmarried woman, White 
states that once marriage is found not to be a requirement, 
"there is no reason to distinguish between heterosexual relation-
ships and homosexual relationships in determining whether the 
relationship is significant and stable."H 
White also disagreed with the majority's argument that the 
extension of liability beyond parent-child and husband-wife re-
lationships would result in "unlimited liability" in the absence 
of rigidly adhered to rules. 111 In response to that argument White 
quotes Ochos: 
We should be sorry to adopt a rule which would 
bar all such claims on grounds of policy alone, 
and in order to prevent the possible success of un-
righteous or groundless action. Such a course in-
volves the denial of redress in meritorious cases, 
and it necessarily implies a certain degree of dis-
trust, which we do not share, in the capacity of 
legal tribunals to get at the truth in this class of 
claim.le 
While the dissent disagreed with the majority's reasoning it 
agreed with the judgment. White states that the tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress "will not lie for bad manners or 
trivialities, but tortious conduct resulting in substantial inva-
sions of clearly protected rights. . . . Recovery for this tort was 
not meant to cover every situation in which an individual acts 
12. [d. at 1283·84, 237 Cal. Rptr. 883. 
13. [d. at 1284, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 883. 
14. [d. at 1283, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 883. 
15. [d. at 1274, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876. 
16. [d. at 1280·81, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (citing Ochoa, 39 Cal. 3d 171, 703 P.2d 1216, 
216 Cal. Rptr. 669). 
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improperly .... "l7 
While Justice White has written a sensitive and forceful ho-
mosexual rights opinion, it is often difficult for a nonmember of 
a despised, oppressed class to appreciate the magnitude of the 
humiliation and emotional injury that results from blind bigotry. 
Each day homosexuals are verbally assailed and brutally as-
saulted solely because they are homosexual. Had this case in-
volved a racial situation in which a heterosexual woman watched 
as a bus driver hurled racial epitaths at and struck her mate in 
the face, the co~duct may not have been so quickly character-
ized as "bad manners or trivialities." 
The homophobic bias of the majority opinion is apparent in 
its general lack of respect for the plaintiff and his life-partner. 
The judge refers to plaintiff's life-partner by his surname only, 
while affording the assaulting bus driver the common courtesy of 
using his full name. The dissent refers to Robert Ervin by his 
full name. 
Additionally, the majority opinion never respects the legiti-
macy of the relationship between the two men. The judge refers 
to Ervin as the "male friend" of the plaintiff, while the dissent 
refers to Ervin as the plaintiff's "significant other". 
The legislature's and judiciary'S illegitimation of homosex-
ual relationships is a key method used to deprive homosexuals of 
their rights. The majority found Ledger inapposite because 
homosexuals could never have a marital relationship, even a "de 
facto" one. To prevent homosexuals from legally marrying and 
then deny them rights and benefits because they are not married 
is patently absurd. 
Heterosexuals have the option to marry and fall within the 
majority's criteria for standing to bring an action for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. To disallow every homosexual re-
lationship standing regardless of its significance and duration is 
17. [d. at 1274, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 883. 
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homophobia at its height. The law should not be used to perpet-
uate bigotry and injustice. 
Michele M. Feher* 
C. ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
1. Plaintiff, whose daughter died in childbirth, denied ec-
onomic damages sustained by quitting her job to care 
for daughter's children. 
St. Francis Medical Center u. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 
App. 3d. 668, 239 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1987). In St. Francis Medical 
Center u. Superior Court, the court of appeal held that a plain-
tiff, whose daughter had died in childbirth, could not recover ec-
onomic damages she sustained by quitting her job to care for ,her 
daughter's children. The court reasoned that the defendants 
owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, and that because plaintiff's 
grandchildren had a statutory cause of action for wrongful 
death, any award of damages to plaintiff would result in a wind-
fall to her. 
Cynthia Patterson died while giving birth to her third child 
at St. Francis Medical Center. Her mother, Ruth Patterson, be-
came guardian ad litem for Cynthia's three minor children and 
quit her job to care for the children. 
Ruth Patterson and her three grandchildren brought a 
wrongful death action against the hospital and two doctors. The 
hospital then filed a motion for summary judgment, on the 
ground that Ruth Patterson could not maintain such an action 
because she was not one of the persons authorized by Code of 
Civil Procedure section 377.1 Plaintiff was allowed to amend her 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
1. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973 & Supp. 1988) provides that the heirs of 
one whose death was caused by negligence may bring an action for wrongful death 
against the wrongdoer. The heirs include those who would be entitled to succeed to the 
decedent's property, and children, spouses, stepchildren, putative spouses, children of 
putative spouses, and parents who were dependents. 
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complaint. In the amended complaint, plaintiff separated her 
cause of action from those of the children and changed her cause 
of action to negligence. Patterson claimed that defendants 
should have reasonably foreseen that by negligently causing the 
death of her daughter, Ms. Patterson would become responsible 
for the care of her grandchildren and would thereby suffer eco-
nomic damages. 
St. Francis demurred to the negligence cause of action, and 
the doctors moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The supe-
rior court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. Defendants then appealed. 
In making its decision, the court of appeal examined the 
policy against double recovery and the issue of whether defend-
ant owed plaintiff a duty of care. The existence of a duty of care 
to another is a question of law.2 The court stated that plaintiff's 
claim was derived from defendant's negligent treatment of her 
daughter, not from direct negligent behavior towards plaintiff. 
Therefore, plaintiff could recover only if she were a third party 
to whom defendants' duty of care extended. A duty of care in-
cludes third parties only in limited situations. A third party may 
bring an action for wrongful death under Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 377, for which plaintiff did not qualify.s A third 
party may also bring an action where she is a witness to the neg-
ligent conduct and thereby suffers emotional distress.' Patterson 
did not witness her daughter's death. 
The court analogized the instant case to Martinez u. County 
of Los Angeles/' in which parents of a minor child who had suf-
fered neurological damage at birth brought suit against a health 
care provider under a negligence cause of action. The parents 
claimed damages incurred by restructuring their lives to care for 
their disabled child. The court of appeal approved the denial of 
recovery to the parents, reasoning that any award of damages to 
2.Id. 
3. St. Francis Medical Center v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 668, 670, 239 Cal. 
Rptr. 765, 767. 
4. St. Francis, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 768, relying upon Dillon v. 
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
5. St. Francis, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 239 Cal. Rptr at 768, citing Martinez, 186 
Cal. App. 3d 884, 231 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1986). 
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the parents would result in a windfall, as their minor child could 
also recover for the cost of nursing and other care.6 
In St. Francis, the court relied on this same line of reason-
ing. Because the minor grandchildren could seek damages for 
their care and support, and Ms. Patterson might then seek reim-
bursement, plaintiff should not be able to recover economic 
damages herself, because the minor grandchildren could recover 
these damages as the expenses for their care and support. Any 
award of damages to Patterson would result in double recovery. 
By focusing primarily on the possibility of double recovery 
to deny Patterson damages, the court obscured the underlying 
rationale of the case; the chain of causation cannot extend end-
lessly. Some of the damages both Patterson and the children 
sought were identical, such as those expenses incurred for care 
of the children. However, the damages resulting from Patter-
son's termination of her employment were not recoverable by 
the children. Therefore, an award of damages for lost earnings to 
Ms. Patterson would not result in double recovery. The court's 
denial of recovery for lost earnings must then be based entirely 
on the notion that legal causation must end somewhere, and 
that, in the instant case, it ends with Ms. Patterson. 
Amy C. Hirschkron* 
IV. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
1. Plaintiff, claiming ongoing mental and emotional inju-
ries in suit for sexual harassment and intentional in-
fliction of extreme emotional distress, compelled to un-
dergo mental examination without attorney present; 
6. St. Francis, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 239 Cal. Rptr at 768, citing Martinez, 186 
Cal. App. 3d at 894, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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scope of examination excluded inquiry into plaintiff's 
sexual history. 
Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 740 P.2d 404, 239 
Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987). In Vinson v. Superior Court the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that in a suit for sexual harassment and 
intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress in which the 
plaintiff claimed ongoing mental and emotional injuries, the op-
posing party could compel plaintiff to undergo a mental exami-
nation. The court also held that the scope of the exam excluded 
inquiry into plaintiff's sexual history and habits, and that the 
plaintiff did not have an absolute right to have her attorney pre-
sent at the exam. 
Plaintiff applied for a job in 1979 with a federally funded 
program in Oakland. Co-defendant Grant, the director of the 
program, made sexual advances towards her during her inter-
view. Plaintiff declined his advances. Unbeknownst to Grant, 
plaintiff was later hired by the program. She claimed that when 
Grant realized she was employed there, he transferred her into a 
position for which he knew she had no training. Soon afterwards 
he terminated her employment. 
Plaintiff brought a suit for sexual harassment and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. She claimed that defend-
ant's actions had caused her to suffer from various ongoing 
mental and emotional injuries. Defendant moved for an order 
compelling plaintiff to undergo a mental examination to deter-
mine the true extent of her injuries. Plaintiff opposed the mo-
tion claiming it violated her right to privacy. Plaintiff requested 
that if the court allowed the examination it should issue a pro-
tective order prohibiting the examiner from probing into her 
sexual history, habits or practices. She also requested that her 
attorney be present at the examination to assure compliance 
with the order. The trial court ordered plaintiff to undergo an 
examination and denied her motion for a protective order. 
In order to delineate the parameters of discovery available 
to defendants in such sexual harassment suits, the California 
Supreme Court weighed the conflicting interests of the parties. 
The court stated that the interest of women who are plaintiffs in 
sexual harassment suits is best served by discovery procedures 
which protect their privacy, reasoning that women who have 
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been victims of sexual harassment may be deterred from bring-
ing suit for fear that their sexual privacy will be further in-
fringed in the process. 1 The court also stated that defendants in 
these suits have an interest in discovering as broad a range of 
relevant facts as possible. The court must fashion discovery to 
protect both of these interests.2 
In Vinson, the California Supreme Court held that Vinson's 
mental state was "in controversy" for the purposes of California 
Civil Procedure Code section 2032. The section requires that a 
party's mental state be "in controversy" for a mental examina-
tion to be ordered by the opposing party.s The court cited 
Schlagenhauf v. Holder,' in which the United States Supreme 
Court held that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rule 35(a) 
the unsubstantiated allegations of one party as to the mental 
state of another party does not put that party's mental state "in 
controversy". California Civil Procedure Code section 2032 is 
modeled on the federal rule. The California Supreme Court rea-
soned that by alleging ongoing specific mental injuries in her 
pleadings, Vinson had put her mental state "in controversy" and 
could be compelled to undergo a mental examination. 
Defendants urged the court to find that Vinson had waived 
her right to privacy by bringing this action. Therefore, she could 
be subjected to a mental examination with an unlimited scope. 
However, the court held that under California Civil Procedure 
Code sections 2036.1 and 2017 there could be no inquiry into 
Ms. Vinson's sexual history or habits. The court explained that 
the statutes prohibit inquiry into the sexual habits of sexual 
harassment plaintiffs, absent a showing of "good cause" by the 
defendant. Ii 
1. Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 846, 740 P.2d 404, 413, 239 Cal. Rptr. 
292, 302 (1987), citing Comment, Psychiatric Examinations of Sexual Assault Victims; 
A Reevaluation, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973 (1982). 
2. Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 842, 740 P.2d at 411, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 299. 
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2032 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988). 
4. Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 839, 740 P.2d at 408, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 296, citing Schlagen-
hauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). 
5. Id. at 843, 740 P.2d at 411, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 299, citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
2036.1 (Deering Supp. 1988), operative until July 1, 1987, and its replacement, CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 2017 (Deering Supp. 1988), which provides that in a civil suit where con-
duct constituting sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery is alleged, a party 
seeking discovery concerning plaintiff's sexual conduct with individuals other than the 
alleged perpetrator must establish specific facts showing good cause for that discovery. 
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The court stated that through its enactment of these code 
sections, the legislature evinced a clear public policy of encour-
aging sexual harassment victims to bring suit.s The extent to 
which the defense may probe into a plaintiff's sexual relations 
with people other than the defendant is limited. Thus, the court 
reasoned, plaintiff's sexual privacy is infringed upon only to the 
extent necessary for fair resolution of the disputed facts of the 
case.7 The court allowed defendants to compel a mental exam 
with limited scope. 
The court then examined plaintiff's asserted right to have 
her attorney present during the exam. Characterizing the mental 
examination as a hostile setting, Vinson argued that her attor-
ney should be present to protect her from improper questioning 
and the potential of inaccurate reporting of her statements. The 
court held that Vinson was not entitled to have her attorney 
present. 
The court cited Edwards v. Superior Court,8 in which the 
court held a plaintiff claiming emotional injuries as a result of a 
defendant school district's negligence could not have her attor-
ney present at her mental examination. In that case, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not insist on the 
presence of counsel at her mental examination. Referring to 
their holding in Edwards,S The court stated in the instant case 
that "[w]hatever comfort her attorney's hand holding might af-
ford was substantially outweighed by the distraction and poten-
tial disruption caused by the presence of a third person."lO Fur-
6. Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 843, 740 P.2d at 411, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 299, quoting 1985 
Cal. Stat. 1328, § I, in which the legislature stated: 
The discovery of sexual aspects of complainant's (sic) lives, as 
well as those of their past and current friends and acquaint-
ances, has the clear potential to discourage complaints and to 
annoy and harass litigants ... Without protection against it, 
individuals whose intimate lives are unjustifiably and offen-
sively intruded upon might face the "Catch-22" of invoking 
their remedy only at the risk of enduring further intrusions 
into details of their personal lives in discovery .... 
7. Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 842, 740 P.2d at 410, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 298, citing Britt v. 
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 858, 859, 574 P.2d 766, 775, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 704 
(1974). 
8. [d. at 844, 740 P.2d at 412, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 300, citing Edwards v. Superior 
Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846, 130 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
9. Edwards, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846, 130 Cal. Rptr. 14. 
10. Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 845, 740 P.2d at 412, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 300. 
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ther, the court reasoned that an attorney, unfamiliar with 
psychiatry, would be unlikely to understand the relevance of the 
questioning. The court declined to reconsider Edwards, despite 
Justice Sullivan's dissent, joined by Justice Mosk.ll The dissent 
argued that the attorney's presence should be permitted because 
of the adversarial nature of the proceeding. "[F]urthermore, the 
ordeal of submitting oneself to the probing inquiries of someone 
whom the examinee may, as in the instant case, view as a hostile 
medical force, is not to be taken lightly."12 
While the court attempted to shape sexual harassment dis-
covery to protect both parties' interests, they failed to take pub-
lic policy into account when considering the right of plaintiffs to 
have counsel present at mental examinations. The legislature 
has considered the very real potential for invasion into the pri-
vacy and further harassment of sexual harassment litigants. 
However, the court viewed plaintiff's request for her attorney's 
presence as unnecessary "handholding". The court refused to 
distinguish a sexual harassment plaintiff from a plaintiff in a 
simple negligence case. The court cited cases from other jurisdic-
tions which have held that sexual harassment plaintiffs are enti-
tled to have an attorney or a psychiatrist present at a mental 
examination.13 Yet the court failed to recognize that these ap-
proaches more actively promote the stated policy of protecting 
the privacy of sexual harassment plaintiffs. The court should 
have examined the special circumstance of the sexual harass-
ment plaintiff more vigorously, and perhaps considered the al-
ternative of allowing her to have a psychiatrist observe the 
exam. 
Amy C. Hirschkron* 
11. Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 915, 549 P.2d 846, 852, 130 Cal. Rptr. 
14, 20 (Sullivan, J., dissenting, joined by Mosk, J.). 
12. [d. at 845, 740 P.2d at 412, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 300, quoting Edwards, 16 Cal. 3d at 
915, 549 P.2d at 852, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 20. 
13. Vinson, 43 Cal. 3d at 845, 740 P.2d at 412, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 301, citing 
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 585 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (plaintiff in sexual har-
assment suit was permitted to have attorney or recording device present at mental 
exam); Lowe v. Philadelphia, 101 F.R.D. 296 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiff in sexual harass-
ment suit permitted to have psychiatrist or medical expert observe mental exam). 
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